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The	 emergence	 of	 cognitive	 psychology	 in	 the	 late	 1950s	 led	 to	
a	 detailed	exploration	of	the	nature	of	mind,	viewed	as	an	information	processing	
system,	and	with	that,	a	renewed	interest	in	tracing	the	exact	relations	of	mind	to	
consciousness.	Examples	of	empirical	investigation	included:	
1. The	 investigation	 of	 functional	 differences	 between	 preconscious,
unconscious,	 and	 conscious	 processing,	 for	 example,	 in	 studies	 of	 non-
attended	versus	attended	stimuli	in	perception,	learning,	and	memory.
2. Examination	 of	 the	 timing	 of	 conscious	 experience.	When	 in	 the	 course	 of
human	 information	 processing	 does	 a	 conscious	 experience	 arise,	 for
example,	in	input	analysis	of	visual	and	auditory	stimuli?
3. The	 determination	 of	 functional	 conditions	 that	 suffice	 to	make	 a	 stimulus
conscious.		For	example,	does	material	that	enters	consciousness	first	have	to
be	selected,	attended	to	and	entered	 into	a	“working	memory”	or	a	“global
workspace”?
There	 was	 also	 a	 growing	 interest	 in	 how	 all	 these	 functions	 and	 functional	
differences	 were	 implemented	 in	 the	 dynamic	 activities	 of	 the	 brain,	 a	 form	 of	
cognitive	neuroscience	that	was	energised	from	the	1990s	onwards	by	the	
emergence	of	 functional	 magnetic	 resonance	 imaging	 (fMRI),	 positron	 emission	
tomography	(PET), more	 sophisticated	 forms	 of	electroencephalography	
(EEG),	magnetoencephalography	(MEG)	and	transcranial	magnetic	stimulation	(TMS).		
Such	 methods	 also	 allowed	 the	 examination	 of	 other,	related	 questions	 about	
how	states	of	consciousness	relate	to	processing	in	the	brain,	including:	
1. The	search	for	the	neural	causes	and	correlates	of	major	changes	in	normal,
global	conscious	states	such	as	deep	sleep,	dreaming	in	rapid	eye	movement
(REM)	 sleep,	 the	 awake	 state,	 anaesthesia	 and	 global	 disorders	 of
consciousness	such	as	coma	and	vegetative	states.
2. The	search	 for	added	neural	conditions	 that	support	variations	 in	conscious
experience	within	 normal,	 awake	 states,	 such	 as	 visual,	 auditory	 and	 other
sensory	 experiences,	 experiences	 of	 cognitive	 functioning	 (such	 as	 the
phonemic	and	other	imagery	accompanying	thinking	and	metacognition)	and
affective	experience	(motivational	states,	emotions	and	so	on).
3. The search for neural conditions that support altered states of consciousness
in psychopathology and in non-pathological altered states, such as the
hypnotic state, some drug-induced states, meditation, and mystical states.
Much	of	 this	 endeavour	 over	 the	 last	 25	 years	 or	 so	 involved	 a	 period	 of	 ‘normal	
science’	 in	 which	 many	 studies	 attempted	 to	 find	 minimal	 contrasts	 in	 mental	
processes	 that	 either	 were	 or	 were	 not	 accompanied	 by	 consciousness,	 or	
accompanied	by	significant	changes	in	consciousness,	in	order	to	isolate	the	precise	
functional	 and/or	 neural	 changes	 that	 might	 cause	 or	 correlate	 with	 those	
transitions.	 There	 was	 also	 continued	 interest	 in	 developing	 more	 precise	 first-
person	 methods	 to	 accompany	 the	 development	 of	 more	 precise	 third-person	
methods.	 However,	 over	 this	 period,	 deeper	 philosophical	 questions	 about	 the	
nature	and	function	of	consciousness	in	“conscious	processes”	did	not	disappear.	
In	Volume	2	we	focus	more	on	cognitive	approaches,	 in	Volume	3,	more	on	neural	
approaches	and	the	first-person	methods	that	can,	in	principle,	support	them,	and	in	
Volume	 4,	 more	 on	 altered	 and	 transformed	 states	 of	 consciousness,	 along	 with	
enduring	philosophical	questions	about	the	relation	of	consciousness	to	the	material	
world.	 However,	 no	 clear	 separation	 between	 these	 is	 possible	 and	 each	 volume	
contains	a	mixture	of	all	three.		
Unconscious,	Preconscious	and	Conscious	Processing	
In	 the	 study	 of	 how	 conscious	 experiences	 relate	 to	 mental	 processing,	 the	
investigation	 of	 functional	 differences	 between	 unconscious,	 preconscious,	 and	
conscious	 processing	 provide	 a	 natural	 place	 to	 start.	 As	 noted	 in	 Volume	 1,	 the	
acceptance	 of	 unconscious	 mind	 and/or	 mental	 processing	 was	 already	 apparent	
from	the	 late	19th	Century	onwards,	 for	example	 in	the	work	of	Helmholz,	Meyers,	
James,	 Freud,	 Jung	 and	 many	 others.	 However	 it	 was	 only	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	
cognitive	 psychology,	 when	 it	 became	 possible	 to	 view	 the	 mind	 as	 a	 complex	
system,	 along	with	more	 advanced	methods	 of	 studying	 its	 component	 processes	
and	 their	 interactions,	 that	 it	 became	 possible	 to	 specify	 the	 relationship	 of	
conscious	experiences	to	their	associated	processes	in	finer	detail.
In	 their	 examination	of	 the	 “psychological	 unconscious”	Howard	Shevrin	 and	Scott	
Dickman	 (1980—R24)	 provide	 an	 excellent	 review	 of	 studies	 of	 unconscious	 vs.	
conscious	 processing	 from	 the	 late	 1950s	 to	 the	 late	 1970s,	 including	 studies	 of	
selective	 attention,	 subliminal	 perception,	 retinal	 image	 stabilization,	 binocular	
rivalry	 and	 backward	 masking,	 along	 with	 the	 main	 findings	 and	 explanatory	
theories.	They	also	made	some	interesting	suggestions	about	how	the	experimental	
evidence	might	have	a	bearing	on	psychodynamic	theories.		
John	Kihlstrom	 (1987—R25)	 reviews	additional	 research	 that	 reveals	 the	 impact	of	
nonconscious	 mental	 structures	 and	 processes	 on	 the	 individual's	 conscious	
experience,	thought,	and	action.	As	he	notes,	research	on	perceptual-cognitive	and	
motoric	 skills	 indicates	 that	 they	 are	 automatized	 through	 experience,	 and	 thus	
rendered	 unconscious.	 In	 addition,	 research	 on	 subliminal	 perception,	 implicit	
memory,	and	hypnosis	indicates	that	events	can	affect	mental	functions	even	though	
they	 cannot	 be	 consciously	 perceived	 or	 remembered.	 These	 findings	 suggest	 a	
tripartite	 division	 of	 the	 cognitive	 unconscious	 into	 truly	 unconscious	 mental	
processes	operating	on	 knowledge	 structures	 that	may	 themselves	be	preconscious	
or	subconscious.	Given	the	experimental	evidence,	he	also	concludes	that,		
“One	 thing	 is	 now	 clear:	 consciousness	 is	 not	 to	 be	 identified	 with	 any	 particular	
perceptual-cognitive	 functions	 such	 as	 discriminative	 response	 to	 stimulation,	
perception,	 memory,	 or	 the	 higher	 mental	 processes	 involved	 in	 judgment	 or	
problem-solving.	 All	 of	 these	 functions	 can	 take	 place	 outside	 of	 phenomenal	
awareness.	Rather,	consciousness	is	an	experiential	quality	that	may	accompany	any	
of	 these	 functions.	 The	 fact	 of	 conscious	 awareness	 may	 have	 particular	
consequences	 for	 psychological	 function—it	 seems	 necessary	 for	 voluntary	 control,	
for	example,	as	well	as	for	communicating	one's	mental	states	to	others.	But	it	is	not	
necessary	for	complex	psychological	functioning.”	(p.	1450)	
In	 Velmans	 (1991a—R26),	 a	 target	 article	 in	 the	 Behavioral	 and	 Brain	 Sciences	
(followed	by	36	commentaries	and	a	response)	 I	develop	this	analysis	further,	citing	
evidence	that,	in	every	phase	of	human	information	processing	(from	input	to	output)	
processing	 can,	 in	 principle,	 take	 place	 either	 with	 or	 without	 accompanying	
consciousness.	 Furthermore,	 as	 a	 general	 rule,	 in	 cases	 where	 processing	 is	
accompanied	by	phenomenal	 consciousness	 that	 phenomenology	 arises	 too	 late	 to	
enter	 into	 the	 processing	with	which	 it	 is	most	 closely	 associated.	 This	 requires	 re-
examination	of	what	 is	meant	by	a	“conscious	process”.	Processes	can	be	conscious	
(a) in	the	sense	that	one	is	conscious	of	them	(introspectively),	(b)	 in	the	sense	that
they	result	 in	a	conscious	experience,	and	(c)	 in	the	sense	that	consciousness	enters
into	that	process.	Many	(and	arguably	all)	claims	in	the	literature	of	type	(c)	are based
on	 confounds	with	 types	 (a)	 and	 (b).	 However,	 contrary	 to	what	 one	might expect
from	 this	 analysis,	 I	 reject	 “epiphenomenalism”	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 form	 of	 dual-aspect
monism	that	makes	sense	of	the	apparent	causal	efficacy	of	consciousness	in mental
life.1
The	 remaining	 readings	 in	 this	 section	provide	examples	of	how	 the	 relationship	of	
conscious	 to	 preconscious	 and	 unconscious	 processing	 have	 been	 studied	 in	 great	
detail	in	four	areas,	reviewed	by	authors	who	are	leading	researchers	in	those	areas.	
Lawrence	 Weiskrantz	 (1991—R27)	 provides	 a	 very	 informative	 review	 of	 spared	
mental	functioning	in	the	absence	of	its	normally	accompanying	conscious	experience	
in	neurological	 patients	with	 blindsight	 (where	patients	 can	make	accurate	 guesses	
about	the	nature	of	visual	stimuli	that	they	cannot	consciously	see)—an	area	in	which	
he	did	pioneering	research—and	also	in	aphasia,	amnesia,	and	agnosia.	He	then	goes	
on	to	discuss	some	of	the	practical	and	theoretical	implications	of	such	findings.		
1	Although	arrived	at	independently,	this	analysis	is	strikingly	similar	to	that	developed	by	Romanes	
(1885—R21)	in	response	to	Huxley’s	epiphenomenalism.		For	details	see	Velmans	(2009—R64).	
Merikle,	 Smilek,	 and	 Eastwood	 (2001—R28)	 provide	 an	 excellent	 review	 of	 the	
experimental	evidence	for	perception	of	stimuli	without	awareness	of	those	stimuli,	
including	the	effects	of	such	nonconscious	perception	both	on	action	and	conscious	
awareness	 of	 subsequent	 stimuli.	 They	 also	 given	 a	 thoughtful	 evaluation	 of	
“subjective”	versus	“objective”	measures	of	awareness,	and,	therefore,	of	the	value	
of	first-person	measures	that	supplement	more	traditional	third-person	ones.		
Melvin	 Goodale	 (2017—R29)	 provides	 an	 up-to-date	 review	 of	 evidence	 for	 the	
existence	 of	 two	 visual	 pathways	 in	 the	 cerebral	 cortex,	 a	 ventral	 stream	 that	
supports	conscious	visual	experience,	and	a	dorsal	stream	that	supports	the	control	
of	action—suggesting	a	 surprising	dissociation	of	visual	experience	 from	control	of	
action.	Goodale	 suggests	 that	 only	 ventrally	 supplied	 conscious	 representations	 of	
the	visual	world	can	enter	working	memory,	and	thereby	(potentially)	become	part	
of	our	(off-line)	long-term	knowledge	of	the	world.	But	largely	unconscious	dorsally	
supplied	visual	information	is	more	effective	for	visual	(on-line)	control	of	motor	acts	
in	real-time.	This	theme	is	further	developed	by	Mark	Jeannerod	(2007—R30)	in	his	
review	of	innovative	research	on	the	complex	ways	in	which	consciousness	of	action	
relates	 to	 the	 control	 of	 action	 in	 voluntary	 and	 involuntary	 actions,	 and	 the	
consequences	 of	 these	 relations	 for	 differences	 between	 the	 embodied	 self	 that	
actually	 controls	 the	 motor	 acts	 and	 the	 “narrative	 self”	 (the	 self	 as	 consciously	
described).		
Attention	and	Consciousness	
The	 intimate	 links	 of	 attention	 to	 consciousness	 were	 first	 clearly	 spelt	 out	 by	
William	James	 (1890—R31)	 including	 the	 need	 for	 attention	 to	make	 a	 selection	 of	
what	 is	 of	greatest	 interest	 and	 importance,	 and	 the	 suppression	 and	 inhibition	 of	
the	 rest	 from	the	wealth	of	available	information.	However,	a	detailed	examination	of	
the	processes	 that	enable	selection	only	started	 in	 the	1950s	with	 the	work	of	Colin	
Cherry	 (1953)	 and	 Donald	 Broadbent	 (1958).	 Much	 of	 the	 research	 focused	 on	 the	
depth	of	preconscious	analysis	 required	 to	 select	 the	 most	 important	 stimuli,	 along	
with	 research	 on	 how	 deeply	 non-selected	 messages	 were	 analysed.	 As	
Broadbent	 noted	 there	 was	 an	 “information	 processing	 bottleneck”	 in	 human	
information	 processing	 (a	 limited	 capacity	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	 and	 analyse	
stimuli	 in	 parallel)	 so,	 for	 efficiency,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 select	 stimuli	 as	 early	 as	
possible,	and,	according	to	Broadbent,	this	could	be	done	on	the	basis	of	their	physical	
properties.	On	the	other	hand,	as	Anne	Treisman	and	 other	 researchers	 noted,	 one	
might	 need	 to	analyse	 aspects	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	input	 in	 order	 to	 decide	 on	 its	
importance—and	 Treisman	 (1969—R32)	 provided	 a	 classical	 review	 of	 this	 early	
theory	and	research.	
These	 early	 models	 assumed	 that,	 prior	 to	 selection,	 information	 processing	 was	
automatic,	 pre-attentive,	 and	 limited.	 For	 example,	 pre-attentive	 analyses	 of	 verbal	
stimuli	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 simple	meanings	 of	 individual	 words.	 For	
phrases	 and	 sentences	 one	 required	 more	 elaborate,	 flexible,	 focal-attentive	
processing	that	could	deal	with	novelty	and	complexity.	They	also	assumed	that	pre-
attentive	processing	was	“preconscious”,	while	focal-attentive	processing	was	
“conscious”.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 General	 Introduction	 (see	 Volume	 1),	 towards	 the	 late	
1960s	models	 of	 selective	 attention	 and	memory	 combined	 (in	 ways	 anticipated	 by	
William	James).	For	example,	in	the	model	proposed	by	Donald	Norman	(1969—R33),	
once	the	most	“pertinent”	of	the	input	stimuli	are	selected	for	further	processing	by	
a	 limited	 capacity	 attention	 system	 they	 enter	 into	 primary	memory	 and	 become	
conscious.	Once	in	primary	memory,	they	may	be	subjected	to	more	sophisticated,	
focal-attentive	 processing.	 For	 example,	 they	 may	 be	 rehearsed	 and	 stored	 in	
secondary	 memory,	 enter	 into	 problem	 solving,	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 some	 overt	
response,	 and	 so	 on.	 Non-selected	 Information	 remains	 unconscious	 and	 is	
eventually	lost	from	the	system.	
How	 attention	 operates	 and	 contributes	 to	 conscious	 experience	 became,	 and	
continues	 to	 be	 a	 major	 area	 of	 psychological	 research	 with	 increasingly	
sophisticated	focus	on	the	detailed	operations	involved.	The	visual	features	of	input	
stimuli	are	coded	by	topographically	distinct	 regions	of	 the	visual	system	 (Zeki	and	
Bartels,	1999)	which	 leads	one	 to	ask	how	the	activities	of	 these	 feature	analysers	
are	 bound	 together	 to	 form	 the	 coherently	 whole	 objects	 and	 events	 that	 we	
experience	 (the	 “binding	problem”).	Drawing	on	 cognitive	 research	combined	with	
neurological	 findings	 Treisman	 (1998)2	 provided	 an	 excellent	 review	 of	 how	 focal	
attention	 to	 a	 given	 spatial	 location	 contributes	 to	 the	 binding	 of	 the	 features	
analysed	 to	 be	 at	 that	 location.	 And	 Engel,	 et	 al.	 (1999—R34)	 reviewed	 extensive	
evidence	 that	 the	 temporal	 synchrony	 of	 neural	 firing	 patterns	 associated	 with	
attention	to	a	given	object	or	event	(in	the	30-80Hz	gamma	range)	may	contribute	
to,	 or	 even	 be	 the	 binding	mechanism.	 However	 such	 synchronous	 firing	 can	 also	
occur	without	associated	consciousness	(for	example	in	well-practiced	tasks),	so	they	
warn	that	binding	might	be	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	for	consciousness.		
This	 raises	 a	 deeper	 question.	 In	 Velmans	 (1991a—R26)	 I	 also	 distinguished	 focal-
attention	 from	 phenomenal	 consciousness,	 arguing	 that	 (in	 normally	 functioning	
human	minds/brains)	 attention	 is	 necessary	 but	 not	 sufficient	 for	 consciousness—in	
which	case	it	is	important	not	to	confound	the	functions	of	focal-attentive	processing	
with	the	functions	of	consciousness,	which	is	 implicit,	for	example,	in	the	assumption	
that	 “focal	 attentive	 processing	 is	 conscious”.	 However,	 at	 that	 time,	 researchers	
interested	 in	 the	 relation	 of	 attention	 to	 consciousness	 typically	 adopted	 a	 form	 of	
functionalist	reductionism	in	which	the	functions	of	focal-attentive	processing	and	the	
functions	 of	 consciousness	 were	 viewed	 as	 one	 and	 the	 same.	 Miller	 (1962)	 for	
example	had	suggested	that,	“…	the	selective	function	of	consciousness	and	the	limited	
span	 of	 attention	 are	 complementary	 ways	 of	 talking	 about	 one	 and	 the	 same	
thing”	(Ibid.	p.	65).	And,	 in	his	commentary	on	my	target	article,	Baars	(1991)	argued	
that	awareness	and	focal	attention	"covary	so	perfectly,	we	routinely	infer	in	our	
everyday	life	that	they	reflect	a	single	underlying	reality." (p. 669)	3	
2	Unfortunately,	permission	was	not	granted	for	reprint	of	this	paper	but	it	is	available	online	at	
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1692340/	3	For	a	full	discussion	of	the	varying	ways	attention	was	thought	to	be	related	to	consciousness	in	the	
early	1990s	see	Velmans	(1991a,	section	5).		
The	issue	remains	topical.	For	example,	Shiffrin	(1997)	provided	a	thoughtful	review	
that	 explicitly	 dissociated	 the	 “automatic”	 (pre-attentive)	 processing	 versus	 “focal-
attentive”	 processing	 distinction,	 from	 the	 “unconscious”	 versus	 “conscious”	
distinction	 on	 a	 range	 of	 cognitive	measures.	 Koch	 and	 Tsuchiya	 (2006—R35)	 also	
summarize	more	 recent	psychophysical	evidence	of	a	double	dissociation	between	
attention	 and	 consciousness,	 arguing	 that	 events	 or	 objects	 can	 be	 attended	 to	
without	 being	 consciously	 perceived,	 while	 an	 event	 or	 object	 can	 be	 consciously	
perceived	in	the	near	absence	of	top-down	attentional	processing.	Much	depends	on	
what	is	meant	by	“near	absence”	however.	Cohen	et	al.	(2012—R36)	in	an	extensive	
review	 of	 the	 same	 evidence	 along	 with	 much	 additional	 evidence	 drawn	 from	 a	
range	 of	 attention	 research	 paradigms,	 conclude	 once	 again	 that	 attention	 is	
dissociable	 from	 consciousness,	 necessary	 for	 consciousness,	 but	 not	 sufficient	 for	
consciousness.	
From	the	1990s	there	was	also	a	surge	of	interest	in	inattentional	blindness,	the	finding	
that	unless	one	 is	attending	 to	 them,	objects	and	events	may	not	be	noticed	even	 if	
they	are	directly	 in	one’s	 visual	 field	 in	 the	 same	 location	as	objects	and	events	one	
does	notice.	Similarly,	with	change	blindness,	unless	one	happens	to	attend	to	them,	
one	may	 not	 notice	major	 changes	 in	major	 features	 of	 object	 and	 events	 that	 are	
directly	in	one’s	visual	field.	Given	the	important,	practical	consequences	of	this	work	
we	 include	an	authoritative	review	of	 it	 from	the	 laboratory	of	Dan	Simons,	covering	
many	 innovative	 experiments	 that	 pioneered	 the	 investigation	 of	 such	 phenomena	
(Jensen	et	al.,	2011—R37).		
In	his	book	A	Cognitive	Theory	of	Consciousness	Baars	 (1988)	attempted	 to	 integrate	
many	 of	 the	 earlier	 theories	 about	 how	 input	 analysis,	 attention,	 memory	 and	
consciousness	 relate	 to	 each	 other	 by	 positioning	 consciousness	 within	 a	 “Global	
Workspace”	 (GW)	 architecture	 of	 the	 brain—and,	 with	 colleagues,	 he	 continued	 to	
develop	 this	model	 over	 subsequent	 years.	 Consequently	we	 close	 this	 section	with	
McGovern	 and	 Baars	 (2007—R38),	 which	 provides	 a	 useful	 review	 of	 subsequent	
developments,	 the	 relation	 of	 GW	 to	 other	 cognitive	 theories,	 and	 the	 supporting	
evidence.4	As	 they	 note,	 the	 brain	 has	 hundreds	 of	 different	 types	 of	 unconscious	
specialised	processors	such	as	feature	detectors	for	colours,	line	orientation	and	faces,	
which	can	act	 independently	or	 in	coalition	with	one	another,	 thereby	bypassing	 the	
limited	 capacity	 of	 consciousness.		 These	 processors	 are	 extremely	 efficient,	 but	
restricted	 to	 their	dedicated	 tasks.		 The	processors	 can	also	 receive	 global	messages	
and	transmit	them	by	‘posting’	messages	to	a	limited-capacity,	global	workspace	whose	
architecture	enables	 system-wide	 integration	and	dissemination	of	 such	 information.		
Such	communications	allow	new	links	to	be	formed	between	the	processors,	and	the	
formation	of	novel	expert	‘coalitions’	able	to	work	on	new	or	difficult	problems.		
In	 later	 work,	 Baars	 and	 his	 colleagues	 no	 longer	 identified	 consciousness	 with	
attention,	arguing	 instead	 that	attention	 is	 the	“gateway	 to	consciousness”,	and	 that	
“information	 in	 the	 global	 workspace	 corresponds	 to	 conscious	 contents”	 (Baars	 &	
4	See	also	Baars,	Franklin	and	Ramsoy	(2013),	which	provides	a	sophisticated	update	of	the	neural	
conditions	that	might	underly	the	global	workspace.	
McGovern,	1996,	p.	89)—still	a	form	of	reductive	functionalism,	although	this	identifies	
consciousness	 with	 a	 later	 stage	 of	 information	 processing.	 Accordingly,	 they	 give	
consciousness	a	central	role	in	the	economy	of	mind	that	corresponds	to	the	functions	
of	the	global	workspace,	which	are	essential	for	organising	novel	or	complex	activities.	5	
In	one	form	or	another	(see	also	Dehaene	and	Changeux,	2011—R51),	the	GW	model	
remains	the	most	popular,	current	model	of	these	relationships	in	the	field.	
Learning,	Memory	and	Consciousness	
As	noted	above,	attention	has	been	 linked	to	 learning,	memory	and	consciousness	 in	
cognitive	 accounts	 from	 the	 time	 of	 William	 James.	 However,	 from	 the	 late	 19th	
Century	onwards,	studies	of	learning	and	studies	of	memory	remained,	in	part,	distinct	
fields.	Consequently,	with	 the	emergence	of	 cognitive	psychology,	 research	 into	how	
learning	 and	 memory	 respectively	 relate	 to	 consciousness	 focused	 on	 somewhat	
different	questions.	For	example,	from	the	mid	1960s,	Arthur	Reber	initiated	a	seminal	
research	 program	 that	 investigated	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 learning	 of	 rule-governed	
patterns	 in	 stimulus	 environments	 is	 tacit	 (consequent	 on	 simply	 being	 exposed	 to	
material	 rather	 than	 consciously	 intending	 to	 learn	 it),	 and	 the	 resulting	 knowledge	
implicit	 (as	 opposed	 to	 consciously	 explicit),	 for	 example	 in	 the	 way	 that	 children	
naturally	acquire	the	rules	of	language	grammar.	In	Reber	(1989—R39)	he	reviews	the	
differences	 between	 implicit	 versus	 explicit	 learning	 and	 knowledge,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
broader	uses	of	 implicit	 learning,	demonstrating	ways	 in	which	 complex	 knowledge	
can	be	acquired,	held	and	used	to	control	behavior	 in	preconscious	 fashion.	 	Given	
the	 evidence,	 he	 considers	 implicit	 learning	 to	 be	 a	 general,	 modality	 free	 Ur-
process,	 a	 fundamental	 operation	 whereby	 critical	 co-variations	 in	 the	 stimulus	
environment	are	picked	up,	and	considers	how	this	might	function	to	ground	what	is	
commonly	thought	of	as	intuitive	knowledge.	
Endel	 Tulving	 (1985—R40),	 a	 leading	 memory	 researcher,	 introduced	 ways	 of	
relating	different	varieties	of	consciousness	to	different	types	of	memory,	commonly	
referred	 to	 as	 episodic,	 semantic,	 and	 procedural	memory	 (memory	 of	 personally	
experienced	 events,	 symbolically	 represented	 meanings,	 and	 acquisition	 of	 skills).	
According	 to	Tulving	episodic	memory	 is	 associated	with	autonoetic	 consciousness	
(consciousness	 associated	 with	 memories	 of	 one’s	 own	 past	 existence),	 semantic	
memory	 with	 noetic	 consciousness	 (associated	 with	 remembered	 meanings),	 and	
procedural	 memory	 with	 anoetic	 consciousness	 (acquired	 skills	 which	 may	 not	
require	explicit	conscious	knowledge	of	those	skills	or	how	they	are	acquired,	as	 in	
the	acquisition	of	grammar	described	above).	These	memory	systems	and	associated	
experiences	 can	 be	 dissociated	 experimentally,	 developmentally	 (in	 children),	 and	
clinically	 (in	 neurological	 patients).	 For	 example,	 some	amnesics	 lose	 the	 ability	 to	
update	 their	 episodic	 memory	 and	 consequently	 live	 in	 a	 “permanent	 present”	
although	much	of	their	semantic	and	procedural	memory	remains	intact.	The	
5	Note	however	that	the	claim	that	information	in	the	global	workspace	correlates	with,	or	is	
associated	with	conscious	contents,	does	not	warrant	the	conclusion	that	these	are	ontologically	
identical,	or	that	consciousness	carries	out	the	functions	of	the	global	workspace.	See	R23	and	the	
detailed	discussion	of	this	issue	in	Velmans	(2014).		
experiences	 associated	 with	 different	 kinds	 of	 memory	 can	 also	 be	 measured	 in	
different	ways,	 for	example	by	asking	subjects	whether	 they	“remember”	 items	as	
having	occurred	before	(autonoetic)	or	whether	they	“know”	them	(noetic).	
Mental	Imagery	Research	
The	behaviourist	John	Watson	denied	that	visual	imagery	exists,	and	even	now	there	
are	respected	philosophers	of	mind	such	as	Dennett	(1994),	who	deny	the	existence	
of	 conscious	 “qualia”—in	which	 case	 these	 cannot	 be	 subject	 to	 serious	 scientific	
study.	Given	this,	 is	 rather	 ironic	 that	with	the	emergence	of	cognitive	psychology,	
studies	of	mental	 imagery	 flourished.	Allan	Paivio’s	1979	book	 Imagery	and	Verbal	
Processes	 (R41)	 provided	 a	major	 review	 of	 visual	 imagery	 research	 in	 the	 earlier	
period,	 including	 its	 applicability	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 meaning	 and	 other	
symbolic	processes,	as	well	as	perception,	 learning	and	memory.	 In	this,	 its	 impact	
was	seminal,	normalizing	imagery	research	in	a	way	similar	to	the	way	Ulric	Neisser’s	
Cognitive	Psychology	(1967)	normalized	cognitive	psychology.		
The	second	review	in	this	section	(Moulton	and	Kosslyn,	2009—R42)	comes	from	the	
lab	 of	 Steven	 Kosslyn,	 a	 leading	 imagery	 researcher.	 In	 this,	 they	 bring	 aspects	 of	
mental	imagery	research	up	to	date,	but	also	move	beyond	questions	such	as ‘what	
is	 imagery?’,	 ‘can	 imagery	enhance	memory?’	and	 ‘how	 is	 imagery	encoded	 in	 the	
brain?’,	to	ask	‘what	is	the	primary	psychological	function	of	imagery?’.	They	go	on	
to	argue	that	mental	 imagery	allows	us	to	simulate	reality	at	will,	 thereby	allowing	
us	to	predict	what	we	would	experience	in	a	specific	situation	or	after	we	perform	a	
specific	action.		
Some	additional,	distinct	fields	of	consciousness	research	
Volume	 2	 concludes	 with	 influential	 papers	 from	 three	 distinct	 fields	 of	
consciousness	 research,	 each	 of	 which	 have	 substantial	 literatures	 that	 are	 too	
voluminous	and	complex	to	fully	represent	in	this	collection.	
Sleep,	Dreaming,	and	Consciousness	
The	earliest	theory	of	sleep	dates	back	to	the	Ancient	Greek	physician	Alcmaeon	in	
450	BCE6,	and	the	topic	has	been	of	psychological	interest	from	the	time	of	Wilhelm	
Wundt	 (1874—R9).	 In	1899,	Freud	published	his	 Interpretation	of	Dreams,	 in	1925	
Nathaniel	 Kleitman	 created	 the	 first	 sleep	 laboratory	 at	 the	University	 of	 Chicago,	
and	in	1939	he	published	Sleep	and	Wakefulness,	which	became	a	standard	text	for	
the	developing	field.	Aserinsky	and	Kleitman	(1953)	discovered	and	named	rapid	eye	
movement	 (REM)	 sleep	when	 dreaming	 takes	 place,	 and	 in	 1954	William	Dement	
demonstrated	that	sleep	cycles	through	different	stages,	repeated	four	or	five	times	
per	night.		
In	 1977,	 J.	 Allan	 Hobson	 and	 Robert	 McCarley	 (R43)	 proposed	 an	 Activation-
Synthesis	model	of	dreaming,	a	seminal	theory	of	the	neural	systems	that	govern	
6	http://www.howsleepworks.com/research.html	provides	an	instructive	timeline	
dreaming	that	dominated	the	 field	 for	subsequent	decades.	While	not	denying	the	
possible	 psychological	 relevance	 of	 dream	 content,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	 primary	
motivating	 force	 for	 dreaming	 is	 not	 psychological	 as	 argued	 by	 Freud	 but	
physiological	since	the	time	of	occurrence	and	duration	of	dreaming	sleep	are	quite	
constant,	suggesting	a	preprogrammed,	neurally	determined	genesis.	In	their	model	
the	dreaming	state	is	characterized	by:	activation	of	the	brain;	relative	exclusion	of	
external	input;	generation	of	some	internal	input,	which	the	activated	forebrain	then	
processes	as	information;	and	blocking	of	motor	output,	except	for	the	oculomotor	
pathway.	 They	 then	 develop	 a	 physiological	 model	 of	 dream	 state	 activation	
involving	interactions	between	the	bulbar	(BRF),	pontine	(PRF),	and	midbrain	(MRF)	
divisions	of	the	reticular	formation	(initially	explored	in	cats).	They	propose	that	the	
activated	 forebrain	 synthesizes	 dreams	 by	 ﬁtting	 experiential	 data	 to	 information	
endogenously	and	automatically	generated	by	reticular,	vestibular,	and	oculomotor	
neurons	in	the	pontine	brain	stem.	A	speciﬁc	physiological	and	mathematical	model	
of	 the	 pontine	 generator	 (based	 upon	 single	 cell	 recording	 studies	 in	 cats)	 is	
described	 which	 posits	 reciprocal	 interaction	 between	 inhibitory	 aminergic	 (level-
setting)	and	excitatory	cholinergic	(generator)	neurons.	
Over	 subsequent	 years	 research	 in	 this	 area	 continued	 to	 develop7,	 and	 for	 the	
purposes	 of	 this	 collection	 we	 include	 a	 paper	 by	 Llinás,	 and	 Paré	 (1991—R44),	
which	 relates	 dreaming	 research	 specifically	 to	 research	 on	 consciousness,	
comparing	the	thalamocortical	activity	 in	paradoxical	 (REM)	sleep	and	dreaming	to	
that	in	the	waking	state,	along	with	the	role	of	40	Hz	synchronous	oscillations	(found	
in	both	states)	that	underpin	integrated	forms	of	consciousness.		They	conclude	that,	
with	 respect	 to	 these	measures,	 REM	 sleep	 and	 the	 awake	 state	 are	 functionally	
equivalent	 although	 the	 handling	 of	 sensory	 information	 and	 cortical	 inhibition	 is	
different	 in	 the	 two	 states.	 That	 is,	paradoxical	 sleep	and	wakefulness	are	 seen	as	
almost	 identical	 intrinsic	 functional	 states	 in	 which	 subjective	 awareness	 is	
generated.		
The	Development	of	Consciousness	in	Human	Infants	
Many	aspects	of	research	into	infant	development	have	a	direct	or	indirect	bearing	
on	the	development	of	infant	consciousness.	In	Trevarthen	and	Reddy	(2017—R45),	
two	 leading	 researchers	 in	 this	 area,	 summarise	 a	 wealth	 of	 relevant	 findings,	
integrating	 them	 into	 a	 coherent	 stage-by-stage	model	 of	 this	 early	 development	
and	 how	 to	 foster	 it.	 They	 propose	 that	 infants	 can	 be	 aware	 both	 of	 their	 own	
active	 selves	 as	 agents,	 and	 of	 another	 person’s	 moving	 presence	 perceived	 as	 a	
separate	consciousness.	Adult	knowledge	and	reasoning	grows	both	from	a	need	to	
engage	with	the	environment	physically,	and	from	a	need	to	respond	 in	sympathy,	
or	 ‘attunement’,	 with	 other	 persons.	 Newborn	 babies	 can	 move	 to	 choose	
experiences,	imitate	expressions,	and	are	led,	by	age-related	developments	to	learn	
conventional	7	For	example,	Hobson	developed	his	early	work	into	a	general	model	of	waking,	sleeping	and	
dreaming	involving	the	interactions	of	three	factors,	activation	level	(A),	input-output	gating	(I),	and	
neuromodulation	ratio	(M)—see	Hobson	(2009).	Unfortunately,	the	reprint	cost	of	this	paper	was	too	
expensive	to	include	in	this	collection,	but	it	is	available	online	at	
http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v10/n11/abs/nrn2716.html	
meanings	in	a	community	of	self-other-aware	actors.	Through	the	first	two	years,	a	
baby	 shows	 age-related	 advances	 with	 growth	 of	 motor	 powers	 used	 in	
intersubjective	play	and	development	of	object	awareness.	These	developments	are	
adapted	for	lifetime	learning	of	how	to	identify	and	share	meaningful	conventions	of	
a	 culture,	 and	 the	 description	 of	 experiences	 in	 words	 of	 a	 living	 language.	 The	
teaching	of	infants	is	stimulated	and	assimilated	by	the	affections,	playful	humor	and	
imaginative	curiosity	of	the	child	interacting	with	people	they	know	well.	
Consciousness	in	Non-human	Animals	
According	to	Descartes’	Discourse	on	The	Method	(1637)	only	humans	are	conscious,	
while	other	animals	(which	he	refers	to	as	“brutes”)	are	just	non-conscious	machines
—and	this	view	persisted	even	in	modern	times	for	example	in	the	writings	of	Eccles	
(in	Popper	and	Eccles,	 1976),	Humphrey	 (1983),	 and	philosophers	of	mind	 such	as	
Carruthers	 (1998).	 However,	 from	 ancient	 times,	 this	 view	 was	 also	 opposed,	 for	
example	by	 the	panpsychists	 (see	R3)	and,	 from	the	 late	19th	 century	onwards,	on	
the	 grounds	 of	 evolutionary	 continuity,	 for	 example	 by	 Darwin	 (1871),	 Huxley	
(1874—R20)	and	Romanes	 (1882,	1885—R21).	Given	the	accumulating	evidence	of	
intelligence	 in	 non-human	 animals,	 the	 weight	 of	 opinion	 has	 shifted	 the	 default	
position	 to	 the	 view	 that	 many	 (and	 perhaps	 all)	 animals	 are	 conscious	 in	 ways	
specific	 to	 their	 biology,	 although	 the	 degrees	 and	 forms	 of	 such	 consciousness	
remain	a	much-debated	area	of	research.	Given	the	importance	of	this	question	to	
the	 humane	 treatment	 of	 other	 animals,	 debate	 about	 these	 issues	 was	 also	
energized	in	2016	by	the	founding	of	Animal	Sentience,	a	new	online	journal	devoted	
to	these	issues.	
In	 this	 bourgeoning	 field,	 the	 work	 of	 Jaak	 Panskepp	 on	 Affective	 Neuroscience	
(Panksepp,	 1998)	 is	 of	 particular	 importance,	 directly	 challenging	 the	 behaviourist	
prejudice	 that	 there	 is	 no	 rigorous	 way	 of	 studying	 the	 emotional	 states	 of	 non-
human	 animals.	 In	 Panksepp	 (2015—R46)	 he	 summarises	 the	 arguments,	 pointing	
out	 for	 example	 that	 cross-species	 studies	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 deep	 brain	
microelectrode	 stimulation	 of	 specific	 subcortical	 sites	 evoke	 the	 same,	 distinct	
emotional	 behaviour	 patterns	 associated	 with	 rewarding	 states	 (associated	 with	
neural	 systems	 that	 govern	 SEEKING,	 LUST,	 CARE,	 and	 PLAY)	 or	 punishing	 states	
(associated	 with	 neural	 systems	 that	 govern	 RAGE,	 FEAR,	 and	 PANIC/GRIEF)	 in	
animals,	 and	 desirable	 or	 aversive	 ones	 in	 humans—suggesting	 that	 primal	
emotional	 feelings	 in	 humans	 and	 other	 animals	 arise	 from	 the	 same	 subcortical	
circuits,	and	have	similar	evolutionary	origins.8	Many	of	 the	desirable	and	aversive	
effects	of	drugs	also	arise	from	the	same	neurochemical	systems	in	all	mammals	(as	
demonstrated	by	conditioned	place-preference	and	operant	reward	paradigms).	As	
he	 notes,	 humans	 have	 neither	 rewards	 nor	 punishments	 that	 they	 do	 not	
experience	 affectively,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 lines	 of	 evidence	 indicating	 that	 it	 is	
otherwise	in	animals.	He	goes	on	to	discuss	the	shared	mammalian	evolution	of	such	
systems,	for	example	in	the	way	that	deep	subcortical	primary,	instinctual	processes	
8	See	also	Damasio	and	Carvalho	(2013)	for	an	alternative,	accessible	review	of	the	evolutionary	
origins	of	affective	states,	available	online	at	https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23329161.	
and	 secondary,	 higher	 limbic	 emotional-action	 networks	 (critical	 for	 stimulus-response	
learning	and	 instrumental	memory	consolidation),	 interact	with	 tertiary	cortical	 functions	
that	govern	thinking	and	decision-making	and	the	control	of	reﬁned/complex	actions	based	
on	 external	 information	 processing.	 He	 goes	 on	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 a	 more	 precise	
understanding	of	how	these	systems	operate	and	interact	in	all	mammals	can	lead	to	novel	
understanding	and	treatment	of	affective	disorders	in	humans	such	as	depression.		
In	 the	 final	 reading	 for	 this	 Volume,	 Colin	 Allen	 and	Marc	 Bekoff	 (2007—R47)	 provide	 a	
broad	analysis	of	 the	philosophy	and	empirical	 research	on	animal	consciousness	and	the	
debates	 surrounding	 the	 ethics	 of	 animal	 experiments.	 They	 first	 briefly	 survey	
developments	 in	 comparative	 psychology	 and	 cognitive	 ethology—the	 comparative,	
evolutionary,	 and	 ecological	 study	 of	 nonhuman	 animal	 minds,	 including	 thought	
processes,	 beliefs,	 rationality,	 information	 processing,	 intentionality,	 and	 consciousness.	
They	go	on	to	evaluate	the	many	arguments	over	whether	non-human	animals	suffer,	how	
this	can	be	assessed,	and	the	consequent	ethics	of	their	humane	treatment.	Overall,	they	
produce	a	useful	map	of	this	complex	territory	that	can	inform	the	science,	philosophy,	and	
many	practical	disciplines	concerned	with	the	nature	and	welfare	of	non-human	animals.		
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